Abstract Multivariate hash functions are a type of hash functions whose compression function is explicitly defined as a sequence of multivariate equations. Olivier Billet etc. have designed the hash function MQ-HASH and Jintai Ding etc. also propose a similar construction, which the security depends on the difficulty of solving randomly drawn systems of multivariate equations over a finite field. Finding preimage and collision can be reduced to solve the multivariate equations, which is a well known NP-hard problem. To prove the security of MQ-HASH, the designer assume that a multivariate hash function is a pseudo-random number generator. In this paper, we analyze the security of multivariate hash functions and conclude that low degree multivariate functions such as MQ-HASH are neither pseudo-random nor unpredictable. There may be trivial collisions and fixed point attacks if the parameter of the compression function has been chosen. And they are also not computation-resistance, which makes MAC forgery easily.
of MQ-HASH, the author assume that a multivariate quadratic function is a pseudo-random generator. But we will show this is not right. After the proposal of multivariate hash functions, Aumasson and Meier conclude that multivariate hash functions over GF (2) of low degree are neither pseudorandom nor unpredictable [5] . And NMAC message authentication codes built on certain cubic multivariate hash function (which is a proposal of Ding and Yang) [3] allow key recovery faster than by exhaustive search. There are also some trivial collisions and near collisions if the polynomials are sparse.
If a multivariate quadratic equation is used then
it is easy to find collision, since the first order differentials of any quadratic polynomial is affine. This fact leads to the designer to increase the order of the polynomials, at the same time not to decrease the efficiency very much. So the degree of MQ-HASH is four and the order of Cubic Construction by Ding and Yang is three. But the designer ignore a fact that for polynomial equations of degree d, the dth derivative is a constant. This implies that low degree multivariate hash functions are neither pseudo-random nor unpredictable [4] , since we can distinguish it between a random function by compute the dth derivative. If the result is different from previous, then we distinguish the hash because it is different from previous hash functions.
This result is regardless of the finite field F and only needs negligible computation. For the MQ-HASH, we needs 16 times of computation and for Cubic Construction 8 times of computation is enough.
Our Work. In the next section we describe the struction. In section 3 we describe the higher order differential of multivariate polynomials. Section 4 describes the trivial collisions and fixed point attacks. Section 5 describe two methods to distinguish a multivariate hash function from random functions. Section 6 studies the security of MACs built on multivariate hash functions, Eventually we give the conclusion in section 7.
MQ-HASH and Cubic Construction
The MQ-HASH is designed by Billet, Robshaw and Peyrin. It is a Merkle-Damgard construction with the compression function built on multivariate hash functions. The input message M is appended a single bit '1' followed by as many '0' as required to leave the message 64 bits short of a multiple of the block length. The remaining 64 bits are then used for a representation of the length of the input message M in bits. Assume that the message M requires t blocks after padding and so
At iteration i, for 1 i t, the compression function is used to update the value v i−1 of an v-bit chaining variable to v i and v 0 is specified and fixed. Thus we have
The last chaining variable is used as the output of the hash function. The compression function is [7] )Let (S, +) and (T, +) be Abelian groups. For a function f : S → T , the derivative of f at the point a ∈ S is defined as
The i'th derivative of f at the point a 1 , · · · , a i is defined as
Theorem 2.2 [6] [7] From the definition of derivative of multivariate functions, one can get the following result.
Theorem 2.3 For any function f : S → T with degree d, the d-th derivative of f is a constant. [6] . When considering multivariate functions over GF (2) the points a 1 , . . . , a i must be linearly independent for the i th derivative not to be trivial zero.
The next step is to use higher order derivative of multivariate function to attack the multivariate hash functions. In fact, the attack is based on the property that the d-th derivative of a multivariate polynomials f with degree d is a constant. Suppose we compute the d-th derivative of multivariate
we get a constant C, which is independent of the input x and only depends ( 
(1)
we can get the F value of a input x by the following equation without access F :
Proof. We prove the result by induction on the degree of F . For d = 1 the derivative of F at point a 1 is C = F (x + a 1 ) − F (x) and satisfies equation
(1). Suppose (1) holds for d − 1. Then
Equation 2 If this system is used in practice, there will exist some input bits done't effect the output bits. Thus many trivial collisions will be found.
Fixed Point Attacks
In the origin construction of MQ-HASH, Billet, Robshaw and Peyrin give an instance which the chaining variable is 160 bits in length, the message block at each iteration is 32 bits in length, the compression function is H i = F (H i−1 , M ). Since the M has only 32 bits, if we fixed H i = H i−1 = x, then exhaustive search on the M , it is possible to find an M satisfies:
The attack is called fixed point attack [8] [9] , if the ble to insert an arbitrary number of blocks equal to M without modifying the hash code. And it is also possible to producing collisions or a second preimage with this attack. In the above instance of MQ-HASH, to find an M satisfies equation ??,
we have 160 equations with 32 variables, so the probability of success to find such a fixed point is 2 −(160−32) = 2 −128 . Though this is impractical, it implies it must be careful of choose a good parameter for the security of multivariate hash functions.
Two Distinguish Methods for Multivariate Hash Functions
In this section we describes two methods that can distinguish the multivariate hash function from the random functions. And we analysis the efficiency of them. The first algorithm is given in [5] by computing the algebraic normal form of the multivariate hash functions. The second method is to use higher order differentials, which is more general, because it works over any finite field while the first method only work in GF (2). MACs(HMAC). Given a multivariate hash function F : F m+n → F n with degree d, the NMAC construction with a key (k 1 , k 2 ), k i ∈ F n is:
We assume that the iterated hash function has no padding rule and the length of x is equal to one message block. For the MQ-HASH and Cubic Construction, the degree of the NMAC is 4 2 = 16 and 3 2 = 9 respectively. With the higher order differential method, let an attacker have access to NMAC k 1 ,k 2 as a black box, with 2 16 and 2 9 queries for the message of his selection respectively he can compute the dth derivative, which is a constant, then he queries 2 16 − 1 = 65535 and 2 9 − 1 = 511 times respectively again, he can make a new textThe HMAC construction with a secret k is:
Hence it needs to call the compression function at least three times, the degree of HMAC is at least d 3 . So in the MQ-HASH and Cubic Construction, to make a success selective forgery, it needs 2 64 and 2 27 queries.
Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the weakness of low degree multivariate hash functions, it shows that it must be careful when a parameter of multivariate hash function is chosen. We suggest that in order to improve the security of multivariate hash function, the degree cannot be too low, and the field GF (2) is not a good choice. But when the degree is high and other fields are used, the efficiency will be decreased. The other question is there may be many weak instance about the random multivariate polynomials. To deploy a good random system is still an open problem.
